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IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY*
ABSTRACT
“Judicial supremacy” is the idea that the Supreme Court should
be viewed as the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution and
that we should deem its decisions as binding on the other branches
and levels of government, until and unless constitutional amendment
or subsequent decision overrules them. This is desirable because we
want to have an authoritative interpreter of the Constitution and the
Court is best suited to play this role. Under this view, doctrines
which keep federal courts from enforcing constitutional provi-
sions—such as denying standing for generalized grievances, the
political question doctrine, and the state secrets doctrine—are
misguided and should be abandoned.
* Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, Raymond Pryke Professor of First
Amendment Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law. Parts of this paper are
drawn from my book, CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: HOW YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
BECAME UNENFORCEABLE (2017).
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INTRODUCTION
Marbury v. Madison got it right. Chief Justice John Marshall
explained that the Constitution exists to impose limits on govern-
ment powers, and these limits are meaningless unless subject to
judicial enforcement.1 Borrowing from Alexander Hamilton’s
Federalist No. 78, Chief Justice Marshall wrote: “The powers of the
legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not
be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”2 And, he went
on in perhaps the most frequently quoted words of the opinion: “It
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.”3 In other words, the Constitution depends on
having judges with the power to enforce it.
Marshall got it exactly right, and that is why Marbury v. Madison
has been a cornerstone of American government for almost its entire
history. The Constitution exists to limit government, and the limits
are meaningful only if someone or something enforces them.
Enforcement often will not happen without the judiciary.
My thesis is that the Supreme Court should be viewed as the
authoritative interpreter of the Constitution and that we should
deem its decisions as binding on the other branches and levels of
government, until and unless constitutional amendment or subse-
quent decision overrules them. This is what I define as “judicial
supremacy.”4 In this paper, I defend this role for the judiciary and
then sketch some implications from it.5 In Part I, I explain why the
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-78 (1803).
2. Id. at 176; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 426-27 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed.,
1898).
3. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
4. See Frederick Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CALIF.
L. REV. 1045, 1046 (2004) (“Although such a conception is not without merit, it must compete
with an alternative and arguably superior understanding of the raison d’etre of a written
document called a ‘constitution.’ ... Under this alternative view of constitutionalism, judicial
supremacy emerges not because of any nostalgic or unduly idealistic view about the capacities
of the judiciary. Nor does it flow from contempt for the decision-making capacities of ordinary
people. Rather, external constraint on those who are to be constrained from effectuating even
their rational, well-meaning, and good-faith policies and preferences is the natural
concomitant of the external nature of the constitutional norms themselves.”).
5. The label “judicial supremacy” comes from the editors of the William & Mary Law
Review and the title for this symposium. I fear that it conveys a misleading impression. My
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judiciary should be the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution.
In Part II, I draw implications from this and argue that doctrines
that keep the Court from enforcing the Constitution are misguided
and should be abolished. In Part III, I respond to likely criticisms of
my defense of judicial supremacy.
I. WHY THE JUDICIARY?
Of course, federal courts are not the only judicial institution that
enforces the Constitution. State courts also can and do enforce the
Constitution.6 But this in no way diminishes the importance of the
federal courts doing so. State courts often have no authority over
federal officers or the federal government. For example, the law
firmly establishes that state courts cannot grant habeas corpus to
federal prisoners.7 Nor would it make sense to have state courts
resolve issues of federal separation of powers, such as when a
dispute arises between Congress and the President. To pick a recent
example, it would have been unrealistic to expect a state court to
decide the constitutionality of a federal law requiring that the State
Department allow the parents of children born in Jerusalem to have
their passports indicate “Israel” as their birthplaces.8 In situations
like this, when there is a constitutional impasse between the other
branches of the federal government, the federal courts must act as
the umpire. Also, many of the doctrines that keep federal courts
from enforcing the Constitution—such as the limits on suing
government entities and government officers—apply just the same
way in the state courts.9
thesis is not that the judiciary is supreme in all matters; rather, my argument is that the
judiciary is authoritative in matters of constitutional interpretation. 
6. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“Judges in every State shall be bound [by the
Constitution].”); Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884) (“Upon the State courts, equally
with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard, enforce, and protect every right
granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States.” (emphasis added)).
7. See Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411 (1871). 
8. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090, 2096 (2015) (holding that, because the
power to recognize foreign states resides in the President alone, § 214(d) of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act of 2003—which directs the Secretary of State, upon request, to
designate “Israel” as the place of birth on the passport of a United States citizen who was born
in Jerusalem—infringes on the President’s consistent decision to withhold recognition with
respect to Jerusalem).
9. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732 (1999) (holding that state governments
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Nor can we rely on voluntary compliance from the other branches
and levels of government.10 Far too often, legislators and officials
have a strong incentive not to comply with the Constitution.11 These
situations, which often involve the most vulnerable in society, are
where the federal judiciary is needed most.12
Most dramatically, those without political power have nowhere to
turn except the judiciary for the protection of their constitutional
rights.13 The reality is that participants in the political process have
little incentive to be responsive to the constitutional rights of
prisoners, criminal defendants, or those who are not citizens.14
These individuals lack political power—they do not give money to
political candidates; they are generally prohibited from voting; and
they are unpopular and often unsympathetic.15 When is the last
time a legislature acted to expand the rights of prisoners or criminal
defendants? In the competition for scarce dollars, legislatures have
every political incentive to spend as little as possible on prisoners.
Politicians compete to sound tough on crime, not to expand defen-
dants’ rights.16 Yet how much worse might it be if politicians and
have sovereign immunity and cannot be sued in state court, including on federal claims). 
10. There are those who argue that this is sufficient and that judicial review should be
eliminated. See, e.g., JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, PACKING THE COURT 254-55 (2009); MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 127-28 (1999).
11. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1365 n.24 (1997). For example, unconstitutional acts
might be politically popular or economically advantageous.
12. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 135-36 (1980); WILLIAM E. NELSON,
MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 100-01 (2000)
(“Democratically elected legislators and elected executive officials, who are responsible to
popular majorities, cannot be trusted to protect minorities from those majorities. Judges with
life tenure can be.”).
13. NELSON, supra note 12, at 100-01.
14. See Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process Rights of
Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 482, 527 n.209 (1984) (“Since
prisoners as a class are a despised and politically powerless minority, few political checks
exist on legislative manipulation of their freedom, and few legal checks as well.”); see also
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
441, 459 (1999).
15. See Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 459-60; Ben Geiger, Comment, The Case for
Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1191 (2006) (“Ex-offenders
are not just marginalized, they are also a clear example of repeat losers in pluralist politics.
Ex-offenders are often legally disenfranchised.”).
16. But see Trevor Timm, Is the Political Imperative to Be ‘Tough on Crime’ Finally
Over?, GUARDIAN (July 18, 2015, 8:15 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2015/jul/18/political-imperative-tough-on-crime [https://perma.cc/U28U-JJUG] (“[P]residential
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prison officials knew that no court would review the constitutional-
ity of their actions? Admittedly, the Supreme Court has a less than
stellar record of protecting these individuals’ rights, but there is no
doubt that judicial review has provided protections for criminal
defendants and dramatically improved conditions for countless
prison inmates whom the political process abandoned.17 Although
these are obvious examples, the nature of democracy is that the
elected branches of government are often insensitive to the rights of
those who lack political influence.18
More generally, if not for the federal courts, what is to stop
Congress or the President from enacting a law that is unconstitu-
tional but politically expedient? What, other than the drastic
remedy of impeachment, is to stop the President from pursuing
unconstitutional policies when they are politically popular? Often
there is no one—other than the courts—to deter wrongdoing and
compensate those injured by constitutional violations.19
This view of the federal judiciary inevitably derives from the
purpose of the Constitution itself. My agreement with Marbury v.
Madison is ultimately based on my belief that the written Constitu-
tion exists to be the supreme law of the land and to limit what
everyone in government, at all levels, can do.20 
Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe powerfully asked “why a
nation that rests legality on the consent of the governed would
choose to constitute its political life in terms of commitments to an
candidates—who once competed with one another over who was ‘tougher on crime’—are
falling all over themselves to praise reform efforts meant to reduce the number of prisoners
in the US.”).
17.  See Eugene N. Barkin, The Emergence of Correctional Law and the Awareness of the
Rights of the Convicted, 45 NEB. L. REV. 669, 669-70 (1966) (“Cases involving the rights of
prisoners, probationers and parolees—a short time ago judicially ignored because the matters
complained of were regarded as being solely within the purview of the administrators and not
within the jurisdiction of the courts—are now being heard on the merits.”); see, e.g., Graham
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding that the imposition of a life without parole sentence
on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide is unconstitutional); Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the
imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when they
committed their crimes). See generally Julia M. Glencer, Comment, An ‘Atypical and
Significant’ Barrier to Prisoners’ Procedural Due Process Claims Based on State-Created
Liberty Interests, 100 DICK. L. REV. 861 (1996).
18. ELY, supra note 12, at 135-36.
19. NELSON, supra note 12, at 100-01.
20. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. IV.
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original agreement—made by the people, binding on their children,
and deliberately structured so as to be difficult to change.”21 It is
hardly original or profound to answer this question by observing
that the Framers deliberately made the Constitution very difficult
to change as a way of preventing tyranny of the majority and
protecting the rights of the minority from oppression by social
majorities.22 If the structure of government had been placed in a
statute, then the urge to create dictatorial powers in times of crisis
might be irresistable. If only statutes protected individual liberties,
then a tyrannical government could overrule them. If terms of office
were specified in a statute rather than in the Constitution, then
those in power could alter the rules to remain in office.23
Thus, the Constitution represents society’s attempt to tie its own
hands—to limit its ability to fall prey to weaknesses that might
harm or undermine its most cherished values. History teaches that
under the passions of the moment, people may sacrifice even the
most basic principles of liberty and justice.24 The Constitution is
society’s attempt to protect itself from itself. It enumerates basic
values—regular elections, separation of powers, individual rights,
equality—and makes departure very difficult. In large part, the
decision to be governed by the Constitution was animated by fear
that a political majority could gain control of government and
disenfranchise and perhaps persecute the minority.25 Compared to
all other laws, the Constitution is uniquely difficult to amend or
alter, precisely to ensure that the limits it sets are not easily
changed.26
21. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10 (2d ed. 1988).
22. See Norman R. Williams II, Note, Rising Above Factionalism: A Madisonian Theory
of Judicial Review, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 963, 963 (1994); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra
note 2, at 53-54 (James Madison).
23. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1 (“No person shall be elected to the office of the
President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as
President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected
President shall be elected to the office of President more than once.”).
24. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (holding that the wartime
internment of American citizens of Japanese descent, pursuant to an executive order, was
constitutional).
25. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 2 (James Madison).
26. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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Accordingly, in deciding who should be the authoritative inter-
preter of the Constitution, the answer is the branch of government
that can best enforce the Constitution’s limits against the desires of
political majorities. By this criterion, the federal judiciary is the
obvious choice. It is the institution most insulated from political
pressures.27 Article III of the Constitution provides that federal
court judges have life tenure unless impeached and that their salary
may not be decreased during their terms of office.28 Unlike legisla-
tors or the President, they never face reelection.29
Furthermore, the method of federal judicial selection reinforces
its antimajoritarian character. Unlike the House of Representatives,
whose members are elected at the same time, or the Senate, where
one-third of the members are chosen in each election, the President
appoints the Court’s members one at a time, as vacancies arise.30
Generally, no single administration is able to appoint a majority of
the Court or the federal judiciary. The result is that the Court
reflects many political views, not just the one that dominates at a
particular time.
Other reasons exist, too, why the judiciary is the branch of
government that is best suited to enforce the Constitution and
should be deemed its authoritative interpreter. First, the judiciary
is the only institution obligated to hear the complaints of a single
person. For the most part, the federal judiciary’s jurisdiction is
mandatory. Although the Supreme Court can choose which cases to
hear, a lower federal court must (with relatively rare exceptions)31
rule on every case properly filed with it.32 Long ago, Chief Justice
Marshall wrote, “It is most true that this Court will not take
jurisdiction if it should not[] but it is equally true[] that it must take
jurisdiction if it should.... We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is
not given.”33
27. William F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison, Interest Groups and the Courts, 6 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 953, 958-59 (1998).
28. U.S. CONST art. III, § 1.
29. Id. art. I, §§ 2-3; id. art. III, § 1.
30. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 2.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
33. Id.
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The legislature and the executive branch, on the other hand, are
under no duty to hear any single person’s complaints. A legislator
or the President could easily ignore an individual or small group
complaining of an injustice. If only a few constituents care about
something, and if acting to help them would consume too much time
for the number of votes it would yield, then politicians often will
ignore them. Moreover, if helping the few will hurt more constitu-
ents, the legislator or the President is likely to disregard the few, no
matter how just their cause. To use the example mentioned
previously, prisoners are a constituency with little political power.
In many states, felons are permanently disenfranchised from voting,
meaning that elected officials need not worry about meeting their
demands.34 Providing adequate resources for prisoners—for their
shelter, food, medical care, and training—requires expenditures
unlikely to be popular with taxpayers, and certainly less popular
than if the government spends the money on almost anything else.35
With no constituency to pressure for prisoners’ humane treatment,
politicians are likely to ignore their rights and needs.36 
However, the law requires the courts to rule on any properly filed
complaint, no matter whether the litigant is rich or poor, powerful
or powerless, incarcerated or not.37 The judiciary is much more
likely than the legislature to listen to criminal defendants’ claims
that their rights were violated or to poor individuals’ objections that
they were denied equal justice, because the courts must at least give
such claims a hearing. The Constitution’s purpose of protecting the
minority from the tyranny of the majority is best fulfilled by an
institution obligated to listen to the minority.
Second, the judiciary is not only the branch most likely to listen
to complaints; it is also most likely to respond to them. The judiciary
is supposed to decide each case on its own merits, subject to the
accepted norm that it should treat like cases alike.38 In every case
in which an individual alleges a constitutional violation, the
judiciary is obligated, if it has jurisdiction and if there is no way to
34. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974).
35. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
36. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
37. See generally U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
38. See William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 735-36 (1949).
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decide the case on nonconstitutional grounds, to issue a constitu-
tional ruling. In contrast, the legislature need not decide each
matter before it on its merits—or at all. Logrolling, vote trading,
and the tabling of bills are accepted parts of the legislative process.39
Procedural devices—like the filibuster and holds—often let a
minority prevent legislative action; for decades, Southerners in the
Senate used them to block civil rights legislation.40 Although their
oath of office forbids legislators to enact laws they believe are
unconstitutional, no law requires legislators to provide a remedy
every time someone complains that the government is violating the
Constitution.41 Only the judiciary is obligated to respond to such
complaints—and this makes the courts an ideal forum for ensuring
that the Constitution is upheld.
Third, as the branch most insulated from day-to-day politics, the
judiciary is the branch most willing to enforce the Constitution in
the face of strong pressures from political majorities.42 Even if the
legislature and executive were to listen to all claims and respond on
the merits, they are still less likely to uphold the Constitution
against the intense opposition of their constituents. This insulation
is what moved Alexis de Tocqueville to remark that “the power
vested in the American courts of justice of pronouncing a statute to
be unconstitutional forms one of the most powerful barriers that
have ever been devised against the tyranny of political assem-
blies.”43 
The argument is not that legislators act in bad faith and disre-
gard their oath to uphold the Constitution, although this sometimes
happens. Rather, it is that constitutional interpretation inherently
39. See Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1338-39 (2000).
40. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 182-
83 (1997).
41. See Oath of Office, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common
/briefing/Oath_Office.htm#1 [https://perma.cc/4ZU8-3QMG] (“I do solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic.”).
42. See Martin H. Redish, Judicial Discipline, Judicial Independence, and the
Constitution: A Textual and Structural Analysis, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 673, 698 (1999) (“[T]he
judicial branch is itself insulated from the majoritarian pressures which Congress is
structured to reflect.”).
43. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 103 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry
Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1835).
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requires choices as to what the Constitution should mean—how its
abstract values should be applied in specific situations. These
choices are best made by an institution whose primary commitment
is to the Constitution, not to gaining reelection. Professor Owen Fiss
observed that “[l]egislatures ... are not ideologically committed or
institutionally suited to search for the meaning of constitutional
values, but instead see their primary function in terms of register-
ing the actual, occurrent preferences of the people.”44 The people can
trust the judiciary much more to decide, for instance, whether the
Constitution should protect the speech activities of a politically
unpopular group like the Nazi Party.45 Because the Court is
committed to upholding the First Amendment and is not faced with
intense pressure from constituents, it is also in a better position to
decide whether the right of privacy includes the right of a woman to
decide whether to have an abortion or whether school prayer
violates the Constitution.46
The best institution for interpreting the Constitution is thus not
the one that most reflects the majority’s current preferences.
Constitutional interpretation is best done by a relatively politically
insulated body. Professor Harry Wellington explained:
If a society were to design an institution which had the job of
finding the society’s set of moral principles and determining how
they bear in concrete situations, that institution would be
sharply different from one charged with proposing policies. The
latter institution would be constructed with the understanding
that it was to respond to the people’s exercise of political power
.... The former would be insulated from such pressure. It would
provide an environment conducive to rumination, reflection, and
analysis.47
44. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1979).
45. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (holding a statute
prohibiting the placement of a Nazi swastika on public or private property to reasonably incite
distress in others to be unconstitutional).
46. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (holding that a Texas statute allowing
abortions only to save the life of the mother unconstitutionally violates the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 205 (1963) (holding that state requirements for prayer in schools unconstitutionally
violate the Establishment Clause).
47. Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
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Constitutional interpretation is a process of deciding what values
are so fundamental that they should be safeguarded from political
majorities.48 It makes little sense to entrust these decisions to those
same political majorities. The judiciary’s insulation and commit-
ment to decisions based on the merits make it far better suited for
this task.49 Professor Alexander Bickel remarked:
[C]ourts have certain capacities for dealing with matters of
principle that legislatures and executives do not possess. Judges
have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the insula-
tion to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of
government. This is crucial in sorting out the enduring values of
a society.50
Constitutional interpretation requires an institution to serve as the
nation’s moral conscience—an institution responsible for identifying
values so important that they should not be sacrificed and remind-
ing the country when its own most cherished values are being
violated. At times, the Supreme Court has functioned in exactly this
way: as a moral conscience holding the nation to its highest values.51
We should trust the legislature least when the question is the
constitutionality of a statute it has enacted. Allowing the same body
to both enact laws and determine their constitutionality is no way
to protect constitutional values. Review by another branch of
government creates a necessary check on the majority.52 The
executive veto provides something of a check, but Congress can
override a veto.53 Moreover, the President is electorally accountable,
at least in his first term, and may feel the same pressures as
Congress.54 The judiciary is most detached from both the enactment
of laws and the implementation of policies. 
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 246-47 (1973).




52. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 2, at 285-87 (Alexander Hamilton).
53. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2.
54. See id. art II, § 1, cl. 1.
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The Court’s self-interest is in enhancing its long-term powers.55
Certainly, the judiciary’s institutional self-interest justifies fear of
its deciding cases to aggrandize its own powers. I argue, however,
that in resolving specific controversies, it is better to trust an
institution with only long-term interests than one with immediate
interests in the outcome of the matter. In sum, once we decide that
a constitution should govern society in order to make certain
matters less amenable to majoritarian control, judicial review is an
essential mechanism for interpreting and enforcing the document’s
limits on majority action. 
The methods of judicial decision-making also make it the best
institution for constitutional interpretation. The judiciary is the
only institution committed to arriving at decisions based entirely on
arguments and reasoning.56 Executive and legislative officials
frequently offer no formal explanations for their decisions, and the
statements they provide usually do not purport to be comprehen-
sive.57 The judicial method is a process of hearing arguments from
the parties, reaching decisions based on those arguments, and
justifying the results with a written opinion.58 Although neither the
Constitution nor any statute compels a court to write and publish
opinions, publicly stated reasons for these decisions are embedded
in the American legal system.59 This country has long recognized
that the “traditional means of protecting the public from judicial fiat
... [require] that judges give reasons for their results.”60
55. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policymaker,
50 EMORY L.J. 583, 585 (2001) (“When they are attentive to external actors, Justices find that
the best way to have a long-term effect on the nature and content of the law is to adapt their
decisions to the preferences of these [other branches].”).
56. See Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative
Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 486 (2015) (“More than other branches of
government, judges are expected to be model reason-givers.”).
57. See Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason-Giving: When May Legal Decision Makers
Lie?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1091, 1118-19 (2010) (describing how the law permits the President
and other administrative agencies to keep the reasons for their actions secret); id. at 1093,
1104 (describing how legislators are usually not required to give reasons for their actions).
58. See G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential
Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 299 (1973).
59. See id.
60. Id.
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For each ruling it hands down, the Supreme Court must write an
opinion demonstrating that its decision was not arbitrary.61 It must
explain why the values it is protecting are worthy of constitutional
status, how those values are embodied in legal principles, and how
a court should apply them in a specific case.62 The Supreme Court
must also explain why its decision is consistent with prior holdings,
is legitimately distinguishable from precedents, or justifies overrul-
ing conflicting cases.63
In contrast, the legislature and the executive need not follow any
particular decision-making process. Neither law nor tradition
requires Congress or the President to state reasons for their
decisions.64 Although Congress produces legislative histories and the
President issues executive proclamations, only the judiciary
commits to reaching its decisions through logical reasoning from
principles rather than via political considerations.65 The law permits
a legislature to make arbitrary choices unsupported by a guiding
principle.66 Even though inevitably the Supreme Court’s constitu-
tional decisions are a product of the Justices’ ideology and values,
the Court still must justify them in legally acceptable terms.67
Moreover, only the judiciary commits to following precedent.68
For all of these reasons, I believe the judiciary’s essential role is
to enforce the Constitution, and legal doctrines must facilitate its
performance of this task. Alternative conceptions of the judicial role
exist, but I reject them. 
One such alternative is that the federal courts’ primary role
should be to resolve disputes between litigants and that resolving
constitutional issues is a secondary function that comes into play
only when parties present these issues in litigation.69 The so-called
61. See id. at 299 n.71.
62. See id. at 299.
63. See Douglas, supra note 38, at 735-36.
64. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
66. See William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative
Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REV. 373,
374 (1988).
67. See White, supra note 58, at 299.
68. See Douglas, supra note 38, at 736.
69. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1282-85 (1976).
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“traditional” model describes adjudication as “a vehicle for settling
disputes between private parties about private rights.”70 
This is not an accurate depiction of the role of the federal courts;
nor should it be. Almost thirty years ago, Professor Abram Chayes
wrote in a famous article:
Whatever its historical validity, the traditional model is clearly
invalid as a description of much current civil litigation in the
federal district courts. Perhaps the dominating characteristic of
modern federal litigation is that lawsuits do not arise out of
disputes between private parties about private rights. Instead,
the object of litigation is the vindication of constitutional or
statutory policies. The shift in the legal basis of the lawsuit
explains many, but not all, facets of what is going on “in fact” in
federal trial courts.71
The traditional model focuses only on private civil litigation and
does not account for all of the criminal prosecutions in federal court
that the federal government brings, or the civil cases in which a
government entity or officer is a party.72
Moreover, the distinction between “private” and “public” adjudica-
tion is largely false.73 The people who bring most cases have suffered
a harm. If any of these people have a desire to vindicate the
Constitution, it is secondary to their personal interests. But the
public’s interest in these cases is different; the public interest has
to do with the rights we all should have.74 Every decision is a
precedent that controls lower courts in subsequent cases and even,
more or less, the Supreme Court. Every Supreme Court decision
makes law that affects all of us; it does not simply resolve individual
disputes.
Finally, if we must make a choice between the “private rights”
and the “public law” models of adjudication, we should follow the
latter to the extent that it better facilitates enforcement of the
Constitution. The choice of a model for adjudication, if we must
make one, should follow from the reasons for having federal courts.
70. See id. at 1282.
71. Id. at 1283-84 (footnote omitted).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 1308.
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The most important role of the federal courts should be to enforce
the Constitution and thus legal doctrines should facilitate that role.
A second alternative vision says that the role of the federal courts
needs to be constrained by the separation of powers. In a dissenting
opinion urging a narrow view of who has standing to bring a case to
federal court, Justice Scalia recently wrote:
That doctrine of standing, that jurisdictional limitation upon our
powers, does not have as its purpose (as the majority assumes)
merely to assure that we will decide disputes in concrete factual
contexts that enable “realistic appreciation of the consequences
of judicial action.” To the contrary. “[T]he law of Art. III stand-
ing is built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of
powers.” It keeps us minding our own business.75
But such an argument begs the question of the appropriate role
of the federal courts. Courts, of course, should “mind[] [their] own
business.”76 But that requires defining what their business is. The
proper role of the federal courts has to be determined based on the
purposes the federal judiciary should serve. If the business of the
federal courts is enforcing the Constitution, that is what the
doctrines defining federal court jurisdiction should facilitate. We
cannot assume, as Justice Scalia does, that restricting the courts’
role best serves the separation of powers. Less judicial review is not
inherently better. Doctrines that facilitate the courts’ function of
enforcing the Constitution advance the courts’ proper role in the
system of separation of powers; doctrines that limit its authority
undermine separation of powers.
Finally, some scholars argue for a more limited role for the fed-
eral judiciary based on their concern that the courts must conserve
their scarce institutional capital. This position is most frequently
associated with Justice Frankfurter and Professor  Bickel.77 Their
view rests on several assumptions: that the judiciary’s credibility is
75. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2695
(2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting Ariz.
State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2665 (majority opinion); and then quoting Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 752 (1984)).
76. Id.
77. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); BICKEL,
supra note 48, at 35.
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fragile; that unpopular, controversial decisions will undermine the
Court’s legitimacy; that if the Court comes to lack legitimacy it will
be disobeyed and rendered less powerful; and that the risk of these
outweighs the costs of not enforcing particular constitutional
provisions.78
All of these assumptions are highly questionable. History shows
that judicial credibility and legitimacy are not fragile. Some of the
Court’s most controversial rulings—such as those reapportioning
state legislatures and desegregating schools—ultimately enhanced
the judiciary’s stature.79 As Professor John Hart Ely wrote:
“[T]he possibility of judicial emasculation by way of popular
reaction against constitutional review by the courts has not in
fact materialized in more than a century and a half of American
experience.” The warnings probably reached their peak during
the Warren years; they were not notably heeded; yet nothing
resembling destruction materialized. In fact the Court’s power
continued to grow, and probably has never been greater than it
has been over the past two decades.80
There is no reason to believe that greater enforcement of the
Constitution by the federal courts will undermine their credibility,
lead to disobedience of judicial orders, or decrease the judiciary’s
power. Quite the contrary; additional enforcement of the Constitu-
tion could well enhance the Court’s public esteem and credibility. At
the very least, it is entirely speculative whether greater enforcement
of the Constitution would have any ill effects.
Most importantly, even if such a risk existed, it is worth bearing
in order to ensure constitutional enforcement. The Court’s very
reason for accumulating institutional capital is to enforce the
Constitution.81 As Professor Tribe remarked, “the highest mission
of the Supreme Court, in my view, is not to conserve judicial
78. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 267; BICKEL, supra note 48, at 35.
79. Cf. Baker, 369 U.S. at 237 (majority opinion) (reapportioning state legislatures);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (desegregating schools).
80. ELY, supra note 12, at 47-48 (footnotes omitted) (quoting EUGENE ROSTOW, THE
SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE 165 (1962)).
81. See TRIBE, supra note 21, at viii.
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credibility, but in the Constitution’s own phrase, ‘to form a more
perfect Union’ between right and rights.”82
II. IMPLICATIONS
My argument implicates that the Supreme Court is the final
arbiter of the Constitution’s meaning and that its interpretation is
controlling until another decision or a constitutional amendment
overrules it. The Court expressed this view perhaps most forcefully
in Cooper v. Aaron, in an opinion each Justice signed:
Marbury v. Madison ... declared the basic principle that the
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by
this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable
feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court
in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land ....
No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war
against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to
support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court
in saying that: “If the legislatures of the several states may, at
will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and
destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the constitu-
tion itself becomes a solemn mockery.”83
I also believe that this view of judicial supremacy means that
doctrines that prevent the Supreme Court from being the authorita-
tive interpreter of the Constitution are undesirable and wrong.
Here, in particular, I would object to justiciability doctrines that
assign responsibility for interpreting the Constitution to other
branches of government.84 
The “generalized grievance” prong of the standing doctrine and
the political question doctrine are key examples of doctrines that
82. Id.
83. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (quoting United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 136
(1809)).
84. In CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOORS: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS MADE YOUR
RIGHTS UNENFORCEABLE (2017), I consider other doctrines that wrongly keep the federal
courts from enforcing the Constitution, including sovereign immunity, individual immunities,
restrictions on habeas corpus, and abstention doctrines.
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prevent federal courts from enforcing the Constitution. I believe we
should abolish both of these doctrines because they prevent the
Court from being the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court is not troubled by these situations in which
no one can seek judicial review because that means the matter is
left to the political process.85 But enforcement of the Constitution
should never be left to the political process. The Constitution exists
to limit the government; those limits have meaning only if they are
enforceable, and to think that the political process will address such
issues is usually to indulge a fiction.86 The kinds of complaints that
courts dismiss for lack of standing or for being political questions
rarely draw the level of public attention needed to make them
political issues.
A. The Standing Doctrine
The Court’s generalized grievance standing doctrine has meant
that some claims of constitutional violations cannot be adjudicated
at all. The courts will deem a case as presenting a generalized
grievance if the plaintiff sues solely as a citizen or as a taxpayer
interested in having the government follow the law.87 For example,
in Ex parte Lévitt, the Supreme Court ruled that a person could not
gain standing as a citizen claiming a right to have the government
follow the law.88 Albert Lévitt sued to have Justice Black’s appoint-
ment to the United States Supreme Court declared unconstitu-
tional, contending that Justice Black could not be appointed to the
Court because, as a senator, he voted to increase Supreme Court
Justices’ retirement benefits.89 Lévitt alleged that this violated
Article I, Section 6, of the Constitution,90 which states that “[n]o
Senator ... shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be
appointed to any civil Office ... the Emoluments whereof shall have
85. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974).
86. See supra Part I.
87. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173-77 (1974).
88. 302 U.S. 633, 633-34 (1937) (per curiam).
89. Id.; see also Daniel H. Pollitt, Senator/Attorney-General Saxbe and the “Ineligibility
Clause” of the Constitution: An Encroachment upon Separation of Powers, 53 N.C. L. REV. 111,
123-24 (1974).
90. Lévitt, 302 U.S. at 633.
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been encreased during such time.”91 The Court held that Lévitt
lacked standing because “it is not sufficient [for standing] that he
has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public.”92 
Similarly, in United States v. Richardson, the plaintiff, William
B. Richardson, claimed that the statutes keeping the Central
Intelligence Agency budget classified violated the Constitution’s
requirement for a regular statement and accounting of all expendi-
tures.93 The Court ruled that he lacked standing because he did not
allege a violation of a personal constitutional right but instead
claimed injury only as a citizen and taxpayer.94 The Court held that
Richardson was “seeking ‘to employ a federal court as a forum in
which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of
government.’”95 The Court ruled irrelevant Richardson’s claim that
if he could not sue, no one could. Chief Justice Burger wrote:
It can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate
this issue, no one can do so. In a very real sense, the absence of
any particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives
support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to
the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political
process.96
In a decision handed down the same day, the Court denied citizen
and taxpayer standing in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to
Stop the War.97 The plaintiffs had sued to enjoin members of
Congress from serving in the military reserves, arguing that the
Incompatibility Clause prevents a senator or representative from
holding civil office.98 This case arose in the context of the Vietnam
War when some members of Congress also served in the Armed
Forces Reserve.99 Again, the Court refused to rule on the claim of
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
92. Lévitt, 302 U.S. at 634.
93. 418 U.S. 166, 168 (1974).
94. Id. at 175.
95. Id. (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)).
96. Id. at 179.
97. 418 U.S. 208, 209 (1974).
98. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
99. See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 210-11.
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unconstitutionality, holding that the matter posed a generalized
grievance.100 The plaintiffs had not alleged any specific violation of
their constitutional rights, only an interest as citizens or taxpayers
in having the government follow the law.101 The Court stated:
Respondents seek to have the Judicial Branch compel the
Executive Branch to act in conformity with the Incompatibility
Clause, an interest shared by all citizens.... 
....
Our system of government leaves many crucial decisions to the
political processes. The assumption that if respondents have no
standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to
find standing.102
These decisions mean that no one has standing to challenge
certain government practices that violate the Constitution. Contrary
to what the Court says, the fact that no one would have standing is
exactly the reason for finding standing. Otherwise, the federal
courts cannot enforce the Constitution.
B. The Political Question Doctrine
Similarly, according to the Supreme Court, certain allegations of
unconstitutional government conduct are “political questions” that
the federal courts should not rule on, even when the case meets all
of the jurisdictional and other justiciability requirements.103 The
Court has said that constitutional interpretation in these areas
should be left to the politically accountable branches of govern-
ment—the President and Congress.104 In other words, the political
question doctrine refers to matters that the Court deems inappropri-
ate for judicial review.105 So, despite an allegation that the Constitu-
tion has been violated, the federal court refuses to rule and instead
100. Id. at 227-28.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 217, 227.
103. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
104. See id.
105. See id.; see also Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1275
(11th Cir. 2009) (referring specifically to the “political question doctrine”).
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dismisses the case.106 In essence, the political question doctrine says
that the federal judiciary cannot enforce some parts of the Constitu-
tion.
I believe that this doctrine is inconsistent with the federal courts’
primary mission of enforcing the Constitution. No allegation of
constitutional violation should exist that federal courts cannot
adjudicate. Professor Martin Redish contended that “the political
question doctrine should play no role whatsoever in the exercise of
the judicial review power.”107 I agree. As I explained above, matters
are placed in a Constitution to insulate them from majoritarian
control, and therefore, it is inappropriate to entrust constitutional
issues to the majoritarian branches of government; we cannot rely
on politically accountable bodies to enforce a document that is
meant to restrain them.108 The federal courts certainly can and
should give deference to the choices of the other branches of
government, but they should do so in rulings on the merits of
individual cases, not through dismissals on justiciability grounds.
1. The Guarantee Clause
The Supreme Court has applied the political question doctrine in
several major areas to rule that federal courts cannot adjudicate
constitutional claims. The most notable examples are cases brought
under Article IV, Section 4, of the Constitution, which states that
“[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government.”109 The Court has consistently
held that cases alleging a violation of this clause—also known as the
Guarantee Clause—present nonjusticiable political questions.110
Several scholars have urged the Court to reconsider this rule.111 It
106. See, e.g., Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1275.
107. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV.
1031, 1033 (1985).
108. See supra Part I.
109. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added).
110. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849).
111. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be
Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849, 851 (1994); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee
Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988)
(arguing that the Guarantee Clause should be seen as a basis for protecting federalism and
states’ rights from congressional interference). But see Ann Althouse, Time for Federal Courts
to Enforce the Guarantee Clause?—A Response to Professor Chemerinsky, 65 U. COLO. L. REV.
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has not done so yet, but Justice O’Connor once remarked that “the
Court has suggested that perhaps not all claims under the Guaran-
tee Clause present nonjusticiable political questions” and that
“[c]ontemporary commentators have likewise suggested that courts
should address the merits of such claims, at least in some circum-
stances.”112
In fact, the first Supreme Court case to proclaim that a matter
was a political question involved the Guarantee Clause. In Luther
v. Borden, in 1849, the Court held that a challenge to the validity of
the Rhode Island state government—which had no state constitu-
tion and still operated under a 1663 charter from King Charles
II—was a political question.113 A dispute arose when the existing
government refused to allow a new government to take office under
a new state constitution that the voters had approved.114 The
Supreme Court held that a federal court could not decide the case:
Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to
decide what government is the established one in a State. For as
the United States guarantee to each State a republican govern-
ment, Congress must necessarily decide what government is
established in the State before it can determine whether it is
republican or not.115
In the Court’s view, the case posed a political question because if a
court declared the state’s government unconstitutional, then this
would invalidate all of the government’s actions and create chaos in
Rhode Island.116 Additionally, the Court, in siding with the existing
Rhode Island government, spoke of a lack of criteria for deciding
what constitutes republican government.117
Since Luther v. Borden, the Supreme Court has never deemed a
state government or state action to violate the Guarantee Clause.118
881, 884-85 (1994); Louise Weinberg, Political Questions and the Guarantee Clause, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 887, 924-28 (1994).
112. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992).
113. See 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 35-36, 42.
114. See id. at 36.
115. Id. at 42.
116. See id. at 41-44.
117. See id. at 42.
118. However, the Supreme Court has decided cases on the merits under the Guarantee
Clause, upholding the challenged government action. See, e.g., Forsyth v. City of Hammond,
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In Taylor v. Beckham, the Court refused to decide whether a state
legislature’s resolution of a disputed gubernatorial race violated
this clause.119 In Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,
it again held that cases under this clause are not justiciable.120
Pacific States involved a challenge to a state law, passed through a
voter initiative, that taxed certain corporations.121 The defendant,
a corporation the state of Oregon sued for failure to pay taxes under
this law, argued that the statute was unconstitutional because the
initiative process, as a form of direct democracy, violated the
Guarantee Clause.122 The Supreme Court held that the matter was
not justiciable, calling the issue “political and governmental, and
embraced within the scope of the powers conferred upon Congress,
and not, therefore, within the reach of judicial power.”123
The effect of the Supreme Court’s decisions since Luther v. Borden
is that the Guarantee Clause is essentially read out of the Constitu-
tion; the Court has never enforced this provision. 
2. Gerrymandering
Challenges to partisan gerrymandering is another type of claim
that the Court has ruled nonjusticiable. Gerrymandering occurs
when the political party that controls the legislature draws election
districts to maximize its own safe seats.124 In a 1986 case, Davis v.
Bandemer, the Court had previously held that challenges to
gerrymandering were justiciable.125
But in Vieth v. Jubelirer, a plurality of Justices dismissed an
equal protection challenge to partisan gerrymandering, stating that
such suits are inherently nonjusticiable political questions.126
Republicans controlled the Pennsylvania legislature and drew
166 U.S. 506, 519 (1897); Foster v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 112 U.S. 201, 206 (1884); Kennard
v. Louisiana ex rel. Morgan, 92 U.S. 480, 482-83 (1875).
119. 178 U.S. 548, 578-80 (1900).
120. 223 U.S. 118, 150-51 (1912).
121. See id. at 119.
122. See id. at 137.
123. Id. at 151.
124. See Robert S. Erikson, Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and Party Fortunes in
Congressional Elections, 66 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1234, 1234 (1972).
125. 478 U.S. 109, 124 (1986).
126. 541 U.S. 267, 277-81 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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election districts to maximize Republican seats.127 This action, of
course, is unique neither to Republicans nor to Pennsylvania.128
Except in places with independent district commissions, election
districts for all levels of government often are drawn to maximize
seats for the party drawing the districts.129
The plurality concluded that Davis had proved impossible to
implement.130 The plurality opinion, written by Justice Scalia and
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and
Thomas, argued that challenges to partisan gerrymandering are
political questions with no judicially discoverable or manageable
standards.131 There is, Justice Scalia wrote, no basis for courts to
decide when partisan gerrymandering offends the Constitution.132
Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote for the majority.133 He
agreed to dismiss the case because of the lack of judicially discover-
able or manageable standards, but he did not believe such stan-
dards could never be developed in the future.134 Thus, he disagreed
with the plurality opinion that challenges to partisan gerrymander-
ing are always political questions: such cases could be heard when
standards were developed.135 Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer
each wrote dissenting opinions arguing that the standards already
existed.136
Two years later, in League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Perry, the Court did not offer any more clarity.137 Again the Court
dismissed a challenge to partisan gerrymandering.138 After Republi-
cans gained control of the Texas legislature in 2002, they replaced
127. Id. at 272.
128. See, e.g., King v. State Bd. of Elections, 979 F. Supp. 582, 586-87 (N.D. Ill.) (describing
the odd shape of Illinois’s Fourth Congressional District, the first Hispanic-majority
congressional district in the Midwest), vacated, 519 U.S. 978 (1996).
129. See Angelo N. Ancheta, Redistricting Reform and the California Citizens Redistricting
Commission, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 109, 109-10 (2014).
130. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278-81 (plurality opinion).
131. Id. at 305-06.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 270 (syllabus).
134. Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
135. See id.
136. See id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 347-51 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 365-
67 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Souter’s dissent.
137. See 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
138. Id. at 410 (plurality opinion).
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the congressional district map drawn by a federal district court in
2001 with one designed to maximize Republican seats.139 The new
map was very successful; the Texas congressional delegation went
from seventeen Democrats and fifteen Republicans in the 2002
election to eleven Democrats and twenty-one Republicans in 2004.140
Many lawsuits challenged the Texas gerrymandering, and once
more the Court did not hand down a majority opinion. Justice
Kennedy wrote for the plurality: “We do not revisit the justiciability
holding but do proceed to examine whether appellants’ claims offer
the Court a manageable, reliable measure of fairness for determin-
ing whether a partisan gerrymander violates the Constitution.”141
The challengers claimed that mid-decade redistricting for openly
partisan reasons provided a “reliable standard” by which the Court
could invalidate the Texas plan, but Justice Kennedy rejected this
argument.142
Justices Scalia and Thomas reiterated their view, expressed in
Vieth, that challenges to partisan gerrymandering are always
nonjusticiable political questions.143 Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito agreed with the dismissal of the suit but did not specify
whether they found the issue nonjusticiable or whether they
thought partisan gerrymandering violated equal protection.144 Chief
Justice Roberts wrote:
I agree with the determination that appellants have not
provided “a reliable standard for identifying unconstitutional
political gerrymanders.” The question whether any such
standard exists—that is, whether a challenge to a political
gerrymander presents a justiciable case or controversy—has not
been argued in these cases. I therefore take no position on that
question, which has divided the Court and I join the Court’s
disposition in Part II without specifying whether appellants
139. Id. at 411-13.
140. See id. at 412-13.
141. Id. at 414.
142. See id. at 423.
143. Id. at 511-12 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
144. Id. at 492-93, 511 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part).
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have failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted, or
have failed to present a justiciable controversy.145
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer again dissented
from the finding that partisan gerrymandering was nonjustici-
able.146 They would have ruled on the merits of the equal protection
claim.147
Although there still has not been a majority opinion holding that
challenges to partisan gerrymandering are always political ques-
tions, after Vieth and Perry it is hard to imagine such a case
succeeding, at least under the current Court. Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito are likely to rule against
such a claim and a Trump appointee will mean that five Justices
probably would rule against any such challenge. The result is that
an individual may raise an allegation of a politically very significant
constitutional violation, but no court can rule on its constitution-
ality.
The Court should have reaffirmed its holding in Davis v. Bande-
mer that partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional. The law
should require states to draw their election districts on the basis of
population, geography, or community interests, not to maximize the
political control of those in power in the legislature. We all were
taught that voters should choose their elected officials; partisan
gerrymandering means that elected officials get to choose their
voters.148
C. The State Secrets Doctrine
Consider one other example involving a different legal doctrine,
but one that is similar to the political question doctrine. Border Pa-
trol stopped Khaled el-Masri, a car salesman from Ulm, Germany,
145. Id. at 492-93 (citations omitted).
146. Id. at 406-07 (syllabus).
147. See id. at 447-48 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 483-84
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
148. This issue is likely to soon be before the Supreme Court again.  In Whitford v. Gill, a
three-judge federal district court declared unconstitutional the gerrymandering of the
Wisconsin state legislature. No. 15-cv-421-bbc, 2016 WL 6837229 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 2016) 
Because it is a decision of a three-judge federal district court, the Supreme Court is required
to take the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012).
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at a border crossing between Serbia and Macedonia.149 The Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), which had confused him with someone
else of a similar name, took him into custody.150 A CIA official in
Langley, Virginia, believed el-Masri had ties to al-Queda.151 On this
hunch, the CIA held him for 149 days, without informing his family
or anyone else.152 El-Masri described how unseen assailants beat
him, stripped him, subjected him to a body cavity exam, clothed him
in a diaper and tracksuit, hooded him, shackled him to the floor of
a plane, and finally knocked him out using a pair of injections.153
When he regained consciousness, el-Masri was in Afghanistan.154
During his captivity, the CIA fed el-Masri putrid food; el-Masri lost
sixty pounds and was regularly “roughed up” during his interroga-
tions.155 Eventually, the CIA officials realized they had the wrong
man and decided to release him.156 As Jane Mayer described it: “The
CIA, meanwhile, had flown Masri to Tirana, Albania, driven him
blindfolded down a long, winding, potholed road, handed him back
his possessions, and dropped him near the border with Serbia and
Macedonia, where he was told to start walking and not look back.”157
El-Masri sued the former Director of the CIA and others in
federal district court arguing that his capture and treatment
violated countless requirements of international law.158 The United
States moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that if a court even
considered el-Masri’s case, it could reveal “state secrets” about the
United States’ rendition program.159 The government’s position was
that the entire matter had to be thrown out of court at the outset.160
At no time did the United States dispute the facts given in el-
Masri’s complaint, nor did it dispute his allegations that the U.S.
149. For the facts of this case, see JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 282-87 (2008).
150. Id. at 282-84.
151. Id. at 282-83.
152. See id. at 283.
153. See id. at 283-84.
154. Id.; see also Complaint at 1, 10, El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006)
(No. 1:05cv1417), aff’d sub nom. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007). 
155. MAYER, supra note 149, at 284-85.
156. See id.
157. Id. at 287. 
158. See El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
159. Id.
160. See id.
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government was responsible for his apprehension and treatment.161
The government’s sole argument was that allowing the case to go
forward risked revealing state secrets.162
El-Masri opposed the motion to dismiss on the ground that the
facts of his case were already public, in Mayer’s book and
elsewhere.163 El-Masri argued that as a result they could try the
entire case on publicly available information, eliminating the risk
of disclosing any state secrets.164 
The federal courts sided with the U.S. government and dismissed
without hearing el-Masri’s case.165 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, writing that “those central
facts—the CIA means and methods that form the subject matter of
El-Masri’s claim—remain state secrets. Consequently, pursuant to
the standards that El-Masri has acknowledged as controlling, the
district court did not err in dismissing his Complaint at the pleading
stage.”166
The Fourth Circuit stressed what it saw as the limited role of the
federal courts:
El-Masri’s position ... fundamentally misunderstands the nature
of our relationship to the executive branch. El-Masri envisions
a judiciary that possesses a roving writ to ferret out and strike
down executive excess. Article III, however, assigns the courts
a more modest role: we simply decide cases and controversies ....
[W]e would be guilty of excess in our own right if we were to
disregard settled legal principles ... especially when the chal-
lenged action pertains to military or foreign policy. We decline
to follow such a course, and thus reject El-Masri’s invitation to
rule that the state secrets doctrine can be brushed aside on the
ground that the President’s foreign policy has gotten out of
line.167
161. See id. at 538.
162. See id. at 535.
163. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the United States’ Motion
to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 16-20, El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d
530 (No. 1:05cv1417).
164. Id. at 16-22.
165. El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
166. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 311 (4th Cir. 2007).
167. Id. at 312-13.
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Thus, these courts refused to even hear el-Masri’s claim that the
government violated his rights under the Constitution and interna-
tional law because there was a chance that doing so might reveal
secrets.
Other courts have also dismissed lawsuits against those who
participated in torture on the ground that it might reveal state
secrets. In Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed a lawsuit brought by five
individuals who claimed, like el-Masri, that the government
subjected them to rendition and torture.168 They sued Jeppesen
Dataplan, Inc., a U.S. corporation that the plaintiffs said provided
flight planning and logistical support services for all of the flights
transporting them among the various locations where the govern-
ment detained and allegedly tortured them.169 The complaint
asserted that “Jeppesen played an integral role” in the abductions
and detentions and “provided direct and substantial services to the
United States for its so-called ‘extraordinary rendition’ program,”
thereby “enabling the clandestine and forcible transportation of
terrorism suspects to secret overseas detention facilities.”170 The
complaint also alleged that “Jeppesen provided this assistance with
... ‘knowledge of the objectives of the rendition program,’ including
knowledge that the plaintiffs ‘would be subjected to forced disap-
pearance, detention, and torture’ by U.S. and foreign government
officials.”171 The plaintiffs sued Jeppesen because the U.S. govern-
ment has sovereign immunity and cannot be sued, whereas
Jeppesen was a private company.
The plaintiffs’ complaint details egregious violations of the U.S.
Constitution and international law. Binyam Mohamed, the named
plaintiff in the lawsuit, was a twenty-eight-year-old Ethiopian
citizen and legal resident of the United Kingdom.172 He was flown
to Morocco where he was subjected to “severe physical and psycho-
logical torture,” including routine beatings that resulted in broken
168. 614 F.3d 1070, 1073-75 (9th Cir. 2010). 
169. See id. at 1075.
170. Complaint at 1, 14, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D.
Cal. 2008) (No. C07-02798 JW), aff’d, Mohamed, 614 F.3d 1070.
171. Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1075 (quoting Complaint, supra note 170, at 5-6).
172. Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1074.
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bones.173 He said that his captors cut him with a “scalpel all over his
body, including on his penis, and poured ‘hot stinging liquid’ into the
open wounds.”174 After eighteen months in a Moroccan prison,
Mohamed was transferred back to American custody and flown to
Afghanistan.175 He claimed, “he was detained there in a CIA ‘dark
prison’ where he was kept in ‘near permanent darkness’ and
subjected to loud noise, such as the recorded screams of women and
children, 24 hours a day.”176 He was fed sparingly and irregularly,
and in four months he lost between forty and sixty pounds.177
“Eventually, Mohamed was transferred to the U.S. military prison
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he remained for nearly five
years.”178 He was then released and returned to the United King-
dom.179
Plaintiff Ahmed Agiza, an Egyptian national who had been
seeking asylum in Sweden, alleged similar facts:
[He] was captured by Swedish authorities, transferred to
American custody, and flown to Egypt ... [H]e claims he was held
for five weeks “in a squalid, windowless, and frigid cell,” where
he was “severely and repeatedly beaten” and subjected to electric
shock through electrodes attached to his ear lobes, nipples and
genitals. Agiza was held in detention for two and a half years,
after which he was given a six-hour trial before a military court,
convicted and sentenced to 15 years in Egyptian prison.180
The other plaintiffs, Abou Elkassim Britel, a forty-year-old Italian
citizen of Moroccan origin, and Bisher al-Rawi, a thirty-nine-year-
old Iraqi citizen and legal resident of the United Kingdom, were
subjected to similar treatment.181 All claimed that Jeppesen was
liable for its knowing participation in the violations of their
rights.182
173. Id. (quoting Complaint, supra note 170, at 21).
174. Id. (quoting Complaint, supra note 170, at 21).
175. Id.





181. See id. at 1074-75.
182. See id. at 1075.
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As in el-Masri’s case, the U.S. government moved to dismiss their
lawsuit based on the state secrets doctrine.183 The Director of the
CIA at the time, General Michael Hayden, filed one classified and
one redacted and unclassified declaration in support of the motion
to dismiss. The public declaration stated that “[d]isclosure of the
information covered by this privilege assertion reasonably could be
expected to cause serious—and in some instances, exceptionally
grave—damage to the national security of the United States and,
therefore, the information should be excluded from any use in this
case.”184 Further, the declaration asserted that “because highly
classified information is central to the allegations and issues in this
case, the risk is great that further litigation will lead to disclosures
harmful to U.S. national security and, accordingly, this case should
be dismissed.”185
The federal district court dismissed the case based on the state
secrets doctrine.186 The Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the
case should go forward.187 But then the Ninth Circuit, in a 6-5 en
banc decision, reversed and ordered the case dismissed, concluding
that “the government’s valid assertion of the state secrets privilege
warrant[ed] dismissal of the litigation.”188 As in el-Masri’s case, the
court did not question the complaint’s allegations, including that the
U.S. government was responsible for torture.189 The court accepted
all of that as true and said that nonetheless, the case had to be
dismissed because it risked revealing state secrets.190
The dissenting judges objected that the plaintiffs’ complaint was
based on publicly available information and that the government
had not shown that litigating the case would require revealing state
secrets.191 The dissent, expressing great concern that the judiciary
was abdicating its most important role, declared that
183. See id. at 1077.
184. Id. at 1076.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 1076-77.
187. See id. at 1077.
188. Id. at 1093.
189. See id. at 1087.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 1094-96 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
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the [state secrets] doctrine is so dangerous as a means of hiding
governmental misbehavior under the guise of national security,
and so violative of common rights to due process, that courts
should confine its application to the narrowest circumstances
that still protect the government’s essential secrets. When, as
here, the doctrine is successfully invoked at the threshold of
litigation, the claims of secret are necessarily broad and hypo-
thetical. The result is a maximum interference with the due
processes of the courts, on the most general claims of state secret
privilege.192
Judge Hawkins, the author of the dissent, wrote that the majority
opinion “disregard[ed] the concept of checks and balances. Permit-
ting the executive to police its own errors and determine the remedy
dispensed would not only deprive the judiciary of its role, but also
deprive Plaintiffs of a fair assessment of their claims by a neutral
arbiter.”193
Torture by agents of the United States in these and other cases
has been documented, including in a report released by the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence in 2014.194 Yet those who suffered
from these acts could not even have their complaints heard in
federal courts. The courts dismissed their claims at the earliest
stage of litigation, reasoning that the plaintiffs failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted based on the state secrets
doctrine.
This reasoning is deeply flawed. The government made no
showing that the litigation would reveal state secrets. As the
plaintiffs alleged, and as the dissent pointed out in Jeppesen, they
sought to rely on information about their abduction, detention, and
treatment that was already widely available.195 At the very least,
the courts could have allowed the cases to go forward and given the
plaintiffs the opportunity to prove their cases with publicly avail-
able documents. Moreover, the courts saw only two choices: allow
disclosure of national security information or dismiss the lawsuits.
192. Id. at 1094 (footnote omitted).
193. Id. at 1101.
194. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, COMMITTEE STUDY OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM, S. REP. NO. 113-288, at
19, 53-55, 59-60, 70, 77, 85-86, 88, 119, 128-29, 160, 238-39 (2014).
195. See supra notes 164, 192 and accompanying text.
1492 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1459
But there was a middle course: try the cases, but do so with
safeguards to protect secrecy.
Most importantly, the federal courts failed at their most basic
mission: upholding the Constitution. We must reject any doctrine,
like the state secrets doctrine, that renders the federal courts
powerless to hear and remedy constitutional violations. The
plaintiffs in these cases were left with no recourse. They could not
sue in federal court, and they could not sue in state court. No
international tribunal likely exists to adjudicate their claims or to
provide a remedy. No judicial forum was available to them, despite
the injuries they suffered. The federal courts had no ability to
enforce the Constitution, federal statutes, or international law. All
legal rules that keep federal courts from enforcing the Constitution,
such as the state secrets doctrine, should be eliminated.
If the government, through the CIA or any other agency, can
pluck a person off the street and detain, interrogate, and torture
him or her without charges or due process in the name of war, then
all of us are at risk. The idea of a constitutional democracy is that
the government must act within the limits set forth in the Constitu-
tion. History teaches that in order to preserve a constitutional order,
an institutional mechanism must exist to keep the government from
exceeding the limits on its power.196 Official self-restraint has never
been enough. No government—especially a hugely powerful
government—has ever been restrained only by voluntary, unen-
forced limits. My central thesis is that the federal courts must
enforce, and must be able to enforce, the limits on government
power found in the United States Constitution.
III. TOO MUCH POWER IN THE FEDERAL COURTS?
Federal judges are unelected, and many have argued that there
is a tension between judicial review and democracy. Over a half
century ago, Professor Bickel called judicial review a “deviant
institution” in American society that raised a “counter-majoritarian
difficulty.”197
196. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 2, at 266-67 (James Madison).
197. BICKEL, supra note 48, at 16-18.
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The Supreme Court often has invoked the need to limit the ju-
dicial role. Lower courts have followed this lead. For example, the
Fourth Circuit did this in justifying the dismissal of el-Masri’s
case.198 One of the more famous declarations was the Court’s
statement in United Public Workers v. Mitchell: “Should the courts
seek to expand their power so as to bring under their jurisdiction ill-
defined controversies over constitutional issues, they would become
the organ of political theories. Such abuse of judicial power would
properly meet rebuke and restriction from other branches.”199
Of course, I agree that the federal courts should not expand their
power to hear “ill-defined controversies over constitutional is-
sues.”200 The matters that I have described, which federal courts
cannot hear, however, do not fit that description. They all involve
people whose rights were violated and who had nowhere else to turn
for a remedy. These cases presented constitutional claims that
should have been heard.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that limiting the
federal courts’ role serves the goal of separation of powers.201 But
the assumption behind such statements is that less judicial review
means better separation of powers. Such a conclusion begs the
question of what the proper role of the federal judiciary is.
The appropriate, and indeed the most important, role of the
federal courts is to enforce the Constitution. When jurisdictional
doctrines facilitate that role, they give the federal judiciary its
proper degree of authority. Doctrines that do more than this would
unduly expand the role of the federal courts. But the doctrines I
have described in Part II undermine the courts’ authority to enforce
the Constitution. Therefore, they should be changed.
198. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 303-04, 312 (4th Cir. 2007).
199. 330 U.S. 75, 90-91 (1947).
200. Id.
201. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2695
(2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“That doctrine of standing, that jurisdictional limitation upon
our powers, does not have as its purpose (as the majority assumes) merely to assure that we
will decide disputes in concrete factual contexts that enable ‘realistic appreciation of the
consequences of judicial action.’ To the contrary. ‘[T]he law of Art. III standing is built on a
single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.’ It keeps us minding our own business.”
(alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (first quoting Ariz. State
Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2665 (majority opinion); and then quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 752 (1984)).
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Phrased slightly differently, doctrines that facilitate the federal
courts hearing of constitutional cases, by definition, should never be
regarded as giving the courts too much power. The content of the
constitutional principles, and not jurisdictional doctrines, should
determine when courts defer to the government and when they
invalidate its actions. Although there are areas in which courts
should defer to the choices of elected government officials, that
deference can be reflected in the constitutional doctrines and the
merits of the decisions; it should not be the basis for dismissals on
jurisdictional grounds that keep the federal courts from hearing the
cases at all.
CONCLUSION
The phrase “judicial supremacy” is an uncomfortable one. It is
difficult to want to defend “supremacy” of any institution. But the
idea that the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Constitution
are controlling is not new. This has been the generally accepted
understanding at least since Marbury v. Madison, and perhaps even
since the ratification of the Constitution. Relatively rarely has this
idea of judicial supremacy been challenged. Recent questioning of
judicial supremacy by politicians and by scholars challenging the
Supreme Court’s marriage equality decision make it important to
explain once more why it is “emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.”202
202. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
